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I. INTRODUCTION
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides,
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb."' What does this clause mean? Where
did it come from? Was the double jeopardy concept "such an integral
part of the common law that many of the first state declarations of

* Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Fraud Division, King County Prosecutor's Office.
B.A. 1970, Boston University; J.D. 1986, University of Washington School of Law. The opinions
expressed herein are solely those of the author.

1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 19:217

rights omitted any mention of it on the theory that it required no
further confirmation, ' or was it "not so fundamental a privilege" in
English law?3 Legal historians disagree. Was the Double Jeopardy
Clause designed to promote the interests of finality;' to prevent
6
harassment of defendants;' to limit the discretion of prosecutors, of
legislatures,' or of judges;8 to save "the public and defendant the cost
of redundant litigation;"' or to equalize "the adversary capabilities of
grossly unequal litigants"?1 ° Was it meant to protect against multiple
prosecutions only,1 or against multiple punishments as well? 2 Was
it designed to protect against criminal jeopardy only, or also against
civil sanctions?' 3 The commentators disagree.
What the commentators do agree on is that double jeopardy is a
realm of law so confusing, so replete with contradictions, corrections,
and exceptions to the rules, that after 120 years no sensible meaning
or policy has evolved. In 1965, the "fictions and rationalizations" that
complicated double jeopardy law were described as the "characteristic
signs of doctrinal senility.' 1 4 The situation since has only worsened,
with Supreme Court justices shifting positions even on fundamental
aspects of the law. 5 These shifts have opened up entirely new areas
of double jeopardy interpretation with respect to parallel civil and
criminal proceedings.
This Article will attempt to distill from this confusion a meaningful double jeopardy policy, applicable to parallel civil and criminal
proceedings, that takes into account the history of double jeopardy,

2. ROBERT S. PECK, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE POLTICS OF INTERPRETATION 116
(1992).
3. JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL
POLICY 4 (1969).
4. Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward A General Theory of DoubleJeopardy, 1978 SUP.
CT. REV. 81, 84.
5. Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 266-67 (1965).
6. Id. at 267.
7. See, e.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983).
8. See Comment, supra note 5, at 267.
9. Id. at 277.
10. Id. at 277-78.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896).
12. See, e.g., Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168-69 (1873).
13. See, e.g., One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972); Helvering
v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
14. Comment, supra note 5, at 264.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989); Whalen v. United States, 445
U.S. 684, 697-98 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 36-37
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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recent changes in statutory law, and the contemporary chaotic state of
parallel civil and criminal proceedings.
Under current law, double jeopardy protects against three abuses:
(1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3)
multiple punishments for the same offense.16
This Article will show that the multiple punishments prong has
little basis in law, other than reliance on dicta that have been repeated
a multitude of times. Examining the history and case law leads this
author to conclude that double jeopardy was intended to prevent
overzealous prosecution, not to curtail the authority of legislatures to
determine which punishments fit the crime. This means that double
jeopardy applies to multiple prosecutions, but not to multiple
punishments. Government overreaching via multiple punishments is
more directly and more logically controlled by applying the Eighth
Amendment Excessive Fines Clause.
If the courts persist in including double punishment within double
jeopardy, then they must define punishment. Forfeiture of proceeds
of crimes should never be deemed punishment, nor should penalties or
forfeitures that roughly compensate the government for its costs of
investigation and prosecution.
Moreover, if the courts continue to include double punishment,
they must determine what the "same offense" means in the context of
parallel criminal and civil proceedings. This Article contends that to
use a more lenient standard in the civil-criminal context than in purely
criminal cases would elevate property interests above liberty interests.
Section II of this Article will look first at the historical underpinnings of the Double Jeopardy Clause and its constitutional development. It will then discuss the development of double jeopardy analysis
in early criminal cases and in early parallel criminal and civil proceedings. Section III will examine judicial analyses of what constitutes the
same offense for double jeopardy purposes, and Section IV will address
the definition of punishment in the civil context. Section V will
analyze whether the Double Jeopardy Clause inhibits the Legislature's
ability to determine what punishments fit the crime, focusing on the
Court's deference to legislative intent. Finally, Section VI will discuss
the cases since 1989-United States v. Halper,17 Austin v. United

16. Halper, 490 U.S. at 440.
17. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
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of Montana v. Kurth

HISTORICAL DOUBLE JEOPARDY ANALYSIS

The Origins and Early History of Double Jeopardy
No early English statutory law mentions double jeopardy.2"
Although the Magna Carta contains the early form of other rights that
subsequently appeared in the United States Constitution, it does not
mention any former jeopardy rights.2" Similarly, the English Bill of
Rights of 1689 contains many antecedents of our Constitution," but
23
it makes no mention of any kind of double jeopardy protection.
Thus the statutory roots of double jeopardy are unclear.
However, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Lords Coke
and Blackstone clarified the concept in their works describing the
common law of England, 4 including the pleas in bar of autrefois
acquit and autrefois convict.2 ' Under these pleas, if a person was
previously acquitted or previously convicted of a crime, the person
could not be tried again for the same offense. Historically, these pleas
only applied to criminal cases; 26 and the word "jeopardy" only applied
to prior verdicts of guilt or acquittal. 27 The pleas in bar of autrefois
acquit and autrefois convict have developed into two of the three prongs
of modern double jeopardy analysis. 28 If we look solely at preA.

18. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
19. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
20. SIGLER, supra note 3, at 4.
21. Id. For example, parts of the Magna Carta are precursors of the United States
Constitution's rights of trial by jury, due process, and habeas corpus. PECK, supra note 2, at 14
and app. A at 323-28.
22. These antecedents include the right to petition the King without being prosecuted for
it; the consent of parliament to raise or keep an army in time of peace; free election of members
of parliament; free speech within parliament; parliamentary consent to levy taxes; and the
principle that "excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." PECK, supra note 2, at 18 (quoting 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 4 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971)); see also id. at app. B. The
language on excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment is virtually identical to the language
in the Eighth Amendment. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
23. SIGLER, supra note 3, at 23.
24. Id. at 17 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 335 (Worcester, Mass., 1790)).
25. Exparte Lange, 85 U.S (18 Wall.) 163, 169 (1873); see also Comment, supra note 5, at
262 n.1.
26. See SIGLER, supra note 3, at 18-19.
27. Id. at 20.
28. "This Court many times has held that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against
three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second
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constitutional history, it follows that double jeopardy should only apply
in the criminal context.
B.

The Constitution

In America, the colony of Massachusetts was the first to codify
double jeopardy, applying it not only to all kinds of criminal cases, but
to civil cases as well.29 Other colonies adopted Massachusetts'
version of the doctrine,30 but this broad double jeopardy protection
was short-lived. After the American Revolution, most of the states did
not incorporate double jeopardy, in any form, into their constitutions.3 New Hampshire was the first state to adopt a Bill of Rights
containing a double jeopardy provision: "No subject shall be liable to
be tried, after an acquittal, for the same crime or offence."3 2 New
Hampshire's protection, limited to former acquittals, was narrower
than that available in colonial Massachusetts.33
The historical development of the Double Jeopardy Clause also
supports the thesis that double jeopardy applies only in the criminal
context and only to multiple prosecutions, not multiple punishments.
James Madison led the effort to add a bill of rights to the Constitution.
On June 8, 1789, during the first session of the new Congress of the
United States, Madison proposed
amendments to the Constitution,
including a bill of rights. 34 His original draft of the double jeopardy
provision stated that "[n]o person shall be subject, except in cases of
impeachment, to more than one punishment or trial for the same
offense." 35 The House of Representatives adopted this language and
sent it to the Senate. The Senate, however, changed the language to
read: No person shall "be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb by any

prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense."
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989).
29. SIGLER, supra note 3, at 21.
30. Id. at 22.
31. Id. at 23.
32. Id. (quoting N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. I, § XVI, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES 384 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959)).
33. Id.
34. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433-36 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
35. Id. at 434.
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public prosecution," 6 then to "nor shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."3 7
The new wording of the Double Jeopardy Clause was different
from all of the prior statutes, including colonial codes and state
constitutions. Its meaning was unclear then, as it is today. Originally,
"jeopardy of life" was based on the fact that most criminal penalties
were capital, and by the eighteenth century, double jeopardy applied
primarily to capital crimes.3"
C.

ConstitutionalInterpretation: The Early Cases
1. Ex Parte Lange

After Congress adopted and the states ratified this constitutional
right, 120 years of judicial interpretation began. Although it was clear
that double jeopardy had previously applied to second prosecutions for
the same offense following acquittals or convictions, 39 after Ex parte
Lange4" courts began to hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause
protects not only against multiple prosecutions, but also against
multiple punishments for the same offense.4
In Lange, the defendant was convicted for stealing United States
mail bags. The law authorized a fine or imprisonment, but not both.
The judge, however, imposed both a prison sentence and a two
hundred dollar fine. Lange went to jail and paid the fine. Shortly
thereafter, the first judgment was vacated and a new sentence imposed,
this time for prison alone.42
After considering these facts, the Court held that vacating the
judgment and imposing a different sentence constituted double
punishment for the same offense because (1) Lange had paid the fine,
which went into the Treasury and beyond the control of the Court,

36. SIGLER, supranote 3, at 31 (emphasis added); see also I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 154 (Linda G. De Pauw
ed., 1972); 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
4
STATES OF AMERICA 37 n.1 (Charlene B. Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986).

37.

4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA 46 (Charlene B. Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986).
38. See SIGLER, supra note 3, at 4-5. "Life or limb" may have been an even earlier concept
because penalties of maiming and mutilation were common during the period before double
jeopardy became limited largely to capital crimes. Id.
39. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 169; see also Halper,490 U.S. at 440.
40. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
41. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 & n.11 (1969), overruled on other
grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989); Halper, 490 U.S. at 440.
42. Exparte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 164.
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and (2) Lange had served five days of a one year sentence.43 Once
the defendant "had fully suffered one of the alternative punishments
to which alone the 44
law subjected him, the power of the court to punish
'
further was gone.
Two aspects of the Lange opinion are notable. First, the opinion
was based on the assumption that the court had exceeded the punishment authorized by the Legislature. The original sentence imposed by
the lower court in Lange was illegal because Congress had not
authorized both a fine and imprisonment. 4 The issue in Lange would
never have arisen if Congress had authorized both confinement and a
monetary penalty. The Lange decision suggests the only unifying
thread in double jeopardy analysis from 1874 until today: that the
Legislature determines punishment, and the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not diminish the Legislature's ability to decide how many
punishments are appropriate for the crime.
The second notable aspect of Lange is that the Court did not rely
on constitutional interpretation to reach its result. In oft-quoted dicta,
the Lange court said, "If there is anything settled in the jurisprudence
of England and America, it is that no man can be twice lawfully
punished for the same offense." 46 To support this broad proposition,
the Court cited only cases involving second prosecutions after a
conviction or acquittal. 47 As a result, the Lange court found no basis
outside the common law for its interpretation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.4" Furthermore, when the Constitution was adopted, the
common law limited double jeopardy to pleas in bar of autrefois acquit,
autrefois convict, former pardon, and autrefois attaint.49 Therefore, no
common law double jeopardy analysis cited by the Court supported its
broad dicta-but then it really needed none, since the Due Process
Clause alone supported the Court's decision. 0 Thus, although Lange
is always cited as the case that establishes the multiple punishments
43. Id. at 175.
44. Id. at 176.
45. See id. at 165.
46. Id. at 168.
47. See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361, 361-62 (1833); Crenshaw v. State, 8 Tenn.
(Mart. & Yer.) 122 (1827); Commonwealth v. Olds, 15 Ky. (5 Litt.) 137, 138-39 (1824).
48. "It is very dearly the spirit of the instrument to prevent a second punishment under
judicial proceedings for the same crime, so far as the common law gave that protection." Ex parte
Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 170.
49. See SIGLER, supra note 3, at 18-19. Former pardon and autrefois attaint are obsolete
English pleas that are irrelevant to American criminal procedure. Comment, supra note 5, at 262
n.1.
50. Montana Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1956 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 176, 178.
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prong of double jeopardy analysis, that part of the Lange opinion is
pure dicta, based on unsupported analysis.
The majority and dissenting opinions in Ex parte Lange portended
the future of the double jeopardy debate. In a vigorous dissent, Justice
Clifford said,
What is meant by the phrase "twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"
has been judicially defined, and the definition cannot now be
enlarged to help out a predetermined unsound judicial conclusion.
It means that a party shall not be tried a second time for the same
offense after he has once been acquitted or convicted, unless the
judgment has been arrested or a new trial has been granted, on
motion of the party; but it does not relate to a mistrial."'
Thus, even in 1874, the debate had begun: Was double jeopardy
meant to include multiple punishments or only multiple prosecutions?
Twenty-two years after Lange, the Court decided United States v.
Ball52 and directly contradicted its dicta in Lange. The Government
charged Millard Fillmore Ball, John C. Ball, and Robert Boutwell with
murdering William Box. A jury convicted J.C. Ball and Boutwell, but
acquitted M.F. Ball.53 The Supreme Court reversed the two convictions because the indictments were insufficient. All three defendants
were reindicted and convicted, and all three appealed, claiming double
54
jeopardy.
Citing the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court said: "The
prohibition is not against being twice punished, but against being twice
put in jeopardy; and the accused, whether convicted or acquitted, is
equally put in jeopardy at the first trial."5 5 The Court held that M.F.
Ball's conviction after acquittal constituted a second jeopardy, but that
the other two defendants could not claim double jeopardy since the
reversal of their original convictions was due to their own appeal.56
The Ball case is infrequently cited, and where it is, it is cited with
Lange to support the idea of a three pronged double jeopardy analysis,
contradicting Ball's very language. 7

51. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 201. Note the similarity to Justice Scalia's dissent
in Kurth Ranch: "'To be put in jeopardy' does not remotely mean 'to be punished,' so by its
terms this provision prohibits, not multiple punishments, but only multiple prosecutions....
[T]he repetition of a dictum does not turn it into a holding ...." 114 S. Ct. at 1955-56.
52. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
53. Id. at 663-64.
54. Id. at 664-66.
55. Id. at 669.
56. Id. at 670-72.
57. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717 & nn.9 & 11.

19961

Civil Forfeitures and Criminal Punishment
2.

225

Coffey: The Early Civil Cases

In 1886, the Supreme Court addressed double jeopardy in the
context of parallel civil and criminal cases. In Coffey v. United
States,58 the Government sued in rem to forfeit Coffey's property,
which consisted of "10 barrels of apple brandy, 1 apple mill, 37 tubs,
and 2 copper stills. "" The seizure of these items was based upon the
same fraudulent acts, attempts, and intents for which Coffey had been
acquitted in a criminal trial.6" The Court barred the civil forfeiture.6 1 The decision was obviously based on autrefois acquit, part of
the multiple prosecutions prong of double jeopardy analysis, because
the defendant had been acquitted of criminal charges and, therefore,
had not previously been punished. But the Coffey court noted that the
result would be different in a suit against the defendant by an
individual: the same offense prong of the double jeopardy analysis
would then become an issue because both the parties and the intent
required would be different.62 Although doubt has been cast on
Coffey's reasoning ever since,6 3 the questions raised by Coffey are with
us today: (1) What constitutes the same offense?; and (2) Is an in rem
forfeiture a penalty? These two questions will be addressed in the next
sections.
III.

WHAT CONSTITUTES THE "SAME OFFENSE"?
If a person has been prosecuted or punished, double jeopardy only
bars a second prosecution or punishment for the same offense. 64 The
question then is, what constitutes the same offense? 6 Blockburger v.

58. 116 U.S. 436 (1886).
59. Id. at 436-37.
60. Id. at 442.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 443.
63. After years of distinguishing it, see, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 405-06
(1938), the Court repudiated Coffey in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms: "The
time has come to clarify that neither collateral estoppel nor double jeopardy bars a civil, remedial
forfeiture proceeding initiated following an acquittal on related criminal charges. To the extent
that Coffey v. United States suggests otherwise, it is hereby disapproved." 465 U.S. 354, 361
(1984).
64. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989).
65. The issue first arose in the civil-criminal context in Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178
(1897). In Stone, the Government sued the defendant for conversion of 3,545 cords of wood from
unlawfully cut trees and received a judgment of $19,000. Id. at 180-81. The defendant had
previously been prosecuted and acquitted for unlawfully cutting and removing timber from federal
land. Id. at 181. The Court distinguished United States v. Coffey, saying that its rule "can have
no application in a civil case not involving any question of criminal intent or of forfeiture of

Seattle University Law Review

(Vol. 19:217

United States6 6 established the rule for determining what constitutes
the same offense. In Blockburger, a purely criminal case, the defendant
was charged with five counts involving two separate sales of morphine
hydrochloride on consecutive days to the same person.6 7 Blockburger
was convicted on the second, third, and fifth counts.6" He was
sentenced to five years in prison on each count, to run consecutively,
and fined $2,000 for each count." The second count charged a sale
of ten grains of the drug.7 The third count charged a sale of eight
grains on the day following the first sale.7' Count five alleged that
the sale in count three had been made without a written order of the
purchaser. Blockburger contended that the sales in counts two and
three were the same offense, and that the sale in count three and the
charge in count five were the same offense. Blockburger argued that
double jeopardy barred these multiple penalties.
Relying on the ancient case of Morey v. Commonwealth,74 the
Court adopted the "same elements" test for determining whether two
offenses are the same for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. 75 The
Blockburger same elements test provides that "where the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions,
the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or
only one is whether each provision
requires proof of an additional fact
76
which the other does not.
This test is the rule today. Although in 1990 the Court briefly
adopted a "same conduct" test for determining whether two offenses
are the same, 77 a bitterly divided Court overruled itself just three

prohibited acts, but turning wholly upon an issue as to the ownership of property." Id. at 188.
The Court relied on the different burdens of proof required in civil and criminal cases and,
specifying the different intents required, the Court said that "an essential fact had to be proved
in the criminal case, which was not necessary to be proved in the present suit." Id.
66. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
67. Id.at 301.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. 108 Mass. 433 (1871).
75. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
76. Id. (citation omitted).
77. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon,
113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993). The "same conduct" test provided that "the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that
prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the
defendant has already been prosecuted." Id.
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years later in United States v. Dixon,78 reinstating the Blockburger
same elements test. 79 The Blockburger same elements test also applies
in Washington state. 80
The question that has been neither directly nor fully answered by
the Supreme Court or the Washington courts is whether the Blockburger same elements test applies in the context of parallel civil and
criminal proceedings.
There is only one logical answer: The
Blockburger test must apply because to apply a less stringent test, such
as the same conduct test, 1 would elevate property interests above
liberty interests.
For example, under the Blockburger same elements test, a
defendant could be criminally prosecuted and punished separately for
selling cocaine and marijuana when both substances were sold at the
same time, because the elements of each crime would contain an
element not contained in the other. But if a same conduct test applied,
and if the same defendant civilly forfeited the car in which he sold the
drugs, he could not then be prosecuted for selling either of the drugs.
No interpretation of double jeopardy law or policy leads to such an
absurd or unjust result.
In the case of forfeiture of proceeds, the elements of the civil
forfeiture and the underlying crime will always be different because
mere possession of proceeds is not a crime. Similarly, where conspiracy, money laundering, and racketeering or profiteering crimes are
charged, the elements of the underlying crimes will always be
different.8 2
The question of what constitutes the same offense in facilitation
cases is a closer call, however, and the lower courts have split. Some

78. 113 S.Ct. 2849 (1993).
79. Id. at 2860.
80. State v. Calle, 125 Wash. 2d 769, 777, 888 P.2d 155, 159 (1995); accord State v.
Gocken, 127 Wash. 2d 95, 896 P.2d 1267 (1995). The Washington Supreme Court has
consistently applied federal double jeopardy analysis to Washington's double jeopardy clause,
WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 9, because they are "identical in thought, substance, and purpose." State
v. Schoel, 54 Wash. 2d 388, 391, 341 P.2d 481, 482 (1959).
81. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
82. See United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1384 (1992) (prosecution for conspiracy and
the underlying offenses does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause); United States v. Chick, 61
F.3d 682, 687-88 (9th Cir. 1995) (conspiracy requires proof of agreement to commit the offense
and proof of participation by the defendant, so criminal conspiracy and civil forfeiture for
underlying offense will never constitute same offense) petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3417
(U.S. Nov. 29, 1995) (No. 95-858); United States v. Saccoccia, 18 F.3d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1994);
United States v. El-Difrawi, 898 F. Supp. 3, 10 (D.D.C. 1995) (money laundering and the
underlying specified unlawful activity are separate offenses under Blockburger), afftd, No. 95-3137,
95-3153, 95-3144, 1995 WL 686255 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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courts have held that forfeitures and crimes can almost never be the
same offense because forfeitures always require proof connecting the
property to the offense, and crimes always require proof of the identity
and intent of the defendant.83 Other courts, however, have rejected
the argument that in rem and in personam actions are necessarily
different offenses.84 Washington's Supreme Court has so far declined
85
to decide the issue.
The United States Supreme Court, in Arizona v. Cook,86 recently
signaled its direction on the same offense issue. Cook was a pre-Dixon
securities fraud case in which the lower court held that the prosecution
of securities violations was barred by the prior imposition of a
$150,000 administrative sanction.87 The Supreme Court accepted
certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Dixon.88 Applying the same elements test to the facts
of Cook, the prosecution would not be barred. 9 The same elements
test must be applied in the civil-criminal context to avoid injustice and
"doctrinal senility.''9

IV.

ARE CIVIL FORFEITURES AND PENALTIES "PUNISHMENT"?

Another fundamental question posed by the multiple punishment
prong of double jeopardy analysis is this: What does punishment

83. See United States v. Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. 1207, 1214-15 (D.Alaska 1995).
granted, 64 U.S.L.W.
84. United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 1995), cert.
3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-345, 95-346); Oakes v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 817, 824
(E.D. Wash. 1994).
85. In State v. Clark, the court declined to decide the same offense issue because the issue
was briefed only by amici curiae. 124 Wash. 2d 90, 101-02, 875 P.2d 613, 618 (1994). In State
v. Cole, the Washington Supreme Court held that forfeiture of proceeds is not punishment, 128
Wash. 2d 262, 277, 906 P.2d 925, 934 (1995), but declined to decide whether a facilitation
forfeiture constitutes the same offense. Instead, the court remanded a consolidated case for the
trial court to determine whether the forfeited property was proceeds or was property that
facilitated a crime. See id.at 292. 906 P.2d at 942-43. If the trial court finds that the property
was forfeited for facilitation, then this case presumably will be before the Washington Supreme
Court again on the same offense question. The split in the plurality opinion in Cole indicates that
a majority of the justices at this time would find that a facilitation forfeiture is the same offense,
although the issue was not analyzed.
86. 870 P.2d 413 (1993), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 115 S.Ct. 44 (1994).
87. Id. at 413-14.
88. In Dixon, the Court reaffirmed the Blockburgerrule for determining whether two distinct
statutory provisions constitute the same offense and overruled Grady v. Corbin. See supra notes
77-79 and accompanying text.
89. Although no result of the remand in Cook is recorded, the Arizona courts have since
applied Dixon in similar cases. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Superior Court, 880 P.2d 735, 737-36,
740-41 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (finding no double jeopardy where defendants were criminally
prosecuted after being ordered to pay restitution and administrative penalties for securities fraud).
90. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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mean? The answer to the question has enormous implications. Is
forfeiture of proceeds of crimes punishment? Can a bank robber keep
the loot if he is prosecuted criminally? Can an embezzler keep the
employer's money? Has a person been punished if he or she forfeits
guns, vehicles, or other property used to facilitate a crime? Is
revocation of a driver's license an impermissible second punishment
after a driver has been convicted of vehicular homicide or drunk
driving? Is revocation of a teacher's license an impermissible second
punishment after the teacher has been convicted of molesting a child?
Is disbarment of an attorney from the practice of law an impermissible
second punishment if it follows the attorney's conviction for theft from
a client?
Prohibition and related tax laws in the 1920s and 30s spawned a
vast increase in double jeopardy cases, multiplying the confusion
surrounding both the doctrine and the punishment issue. On the same
day in 1931, the Court decided United States v. La Franca91 and
Various Items of Personal Property v. United States.92 In La Franca,
the Government sued the defendant for nonpayment of liquor taxes
and penalties, alleging the same unlawful sales of liquor for which he
had been convicted and fined under the National Prohibition Act.93
The statute said that if a violation of the revenue laws was also a
violation of the Prohibition Act, a conviction under one was a bar to
prosecution under the other. 94 The Court, in an egregious example
of bootstrapping, relied on cases that either contained no authority for
their own opinions, were cited out of context, or were irrelevant. The
Court concluded that "an action to recover a penalty for an act
declared to be a crime is, in its nature, a punitive proceeding, although
it take the form of a civil action; and the word 'prosecution' is not
inapt to describe such an action."95
In support of this far-reaching edict, the Court relied primarily on
United States v. Chouteau,96 an 1880 case in which the Government
had charged Chouteau, a distiller, with two counts of violating the
revenue laws for failure to pay taxes.9 7 Because Chouteau paid the
Government one thousand dollars in settlement, the Government

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

282 U.S. 568 (1931).
282 U.S. 577 (1931).
282 U.S. at 570.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 575.
102 U.S. 603 (1880).
Id. at 606.
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dismissed the indictment. 9 The Government had also brought suit
upon the $25,000 bond of the distiller.99 The bond was conditioned
upon compliance with the distillery laws and payment of all penalties
and fines imposed for violations of the laws.1"' Both the criminal
and civil suits were based upon the same acts.10 1 Citing absolutely
no authority, the Court said that "we are of the opinion that the
compromise with the government pleaded is a complete defence against
a recovery of the penalty claimed."'0 2 The Court stated, without
analysis, that the civil action was a penalty, despite the lack of a prior
conviction or acquittal, and the Court even dismissed, with similar lack
of analysis, the case against the surety, who had been neither prosecuted nor punished. 3
Relying upon this language from Chouteau, the La Francacourt
did not analyze the purpose of the civil penalty for unlawful sales of
liquor, but simply declared unequivocally that "an action to recover a
penalty for an act declared to be a crime is, in its nature, a punitive
proceeding."'"
The Court held this, despite citing a prior opinion
written by Justice Holmes that clearly set a precedent for analyzing the
purposes of a civil penalty under double jeopardy law.'
Although
the La Franca court never mentioned "double jeopardy," the Court
conducted a double jeopardy analysis, concluding that its result was
necessary to avoid "doubts" about the constitutionality of the civil
penalty statute.'0 6
The contrast between La Franca and Various Items of Personal
Property illustrates the early confusion surrounding the double jeopardy
"punishment" issue in the civil forfeiture-criminal prosecution context.
In Various Items of Personal Property, the Government filed an in rem
action under the revenue statutes to forfeit a distillery, warehouse, and

98. Id. at 607.
99. Id. at 603.
100. Id. at 603-04.
101. Id. at 610.
102. Id. at 609.
103. Id. at 610-11.
104. La Franca,282 U.S. at 575.
105. Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630 (1926). In Murphy, Thomas and Vincent
Murphy were tried and acquitted of maintaining a nuisance in violation of the National
Prohibition Act. Id. at 630. Thereafter, the Government sued under the same law to abate the
nuisance. Justice Holmes said that the former acquittal would be a bar only if the abatement were
punishment, and he concluded that although the abatement worked a financial detriment, the
"mere fact that it is imposed in consequence of a crime is not conclusive." Id. at 631-32. He
analyzed the purpose of the penalty and determined that it was to prevent such nuisances, not to
punish. Id. at 632. Therefore, the former acquittal was no bar to the civil penalty.
106. 282 U.S. at 576.
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denaturing plant because the corporation conducted its distilling
business with intent to defraud the government of the tax on distilled
spirits.10 7 The corporation and others had previously been convicted
for conspiring to violate the statute based on the same transactions. 08
Disregarding "the rule in Coffey's Case,"'" the Court said that where
a statute creates an in rem right to forfeit property used in committing
an offense, the property is "primarily considered as the offender, or
rather the offense is attached primarily to the thing; and this, whether
In contrast, in
the offense be malum prohibitum, or malum in se.""'
a criminal case, the wrongdoer is considered the offender and is
convicted and punished."' Thus, the Court held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause did not apply in Various Items of Personal Property
because "the forfeiture was no part of the punishment for the criminal
offense."1"
The primary distinction the Court drew between La Franca and
Various Items of Personal Property was that one case was an in rem
procedure and the other an in personam tax penalty. The Court should
have analyzed whether, in fact, either person was punished twice for
the same offense.
Perhaps recognizing the potential problems with its inconsistent
analyses in La Francaand Various Items of PersonalProperty, the Court
returned to the analysis suggested by Justice Holmes in Murphy v.
United States,"' which inquires whether a civil sanction is remedial
or punitive." 4 For example, in Helvering v. Mitchell,"s a taxpayer
who had been acquitted of income tax evasion was administratively
Mitchell claimed the
assessed a fifty percent tax penalty."'

107. 282 U.S. at 578.
108. Id. at 579.
109. So-called in Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178, 188 (1897); see supra text
accompanying notes 58-63.
110. Various Items of Personal Property, 282 U.S. at 580 (quoting The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827)). The Court relied on Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, a case where
the distillery sought to be forfeited was leased, and the lessee's intent was not known to the
owner. 96 U.S. 395, 395-97 (1878). In Dobbins, the Court said that "[n]othing can be plainer
in legal decision than the proposition that the offence therein defined is attached primarily to the
distillery, and the real and personal property used in connection with the same, without any
regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner, beyond what
necessarily arises from the fact that he leased the property to the distiller, and suffered it to be
occupied and used by the lessee as a distillery." Id. at 401.
111. Various Items of Personal Property, 282 U.S. at 581.
112. Id.
113. 272 U.S. 630 (1926); see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
114. See Murphy, 272 U.S. at 632.
115. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
116. Id. at 395.
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$364,354.92 assessment was punishment and therefore barred by the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 117 Justice Brandeis framed the issue as
follows:
Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect
to the same act or omission; for the double jeopardy clause prohibits
merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish
criminally, for the same offense. The question for decision is thus
whether § 293(b) imposes a criminal sanction. That question is one
of statutory construction."'

Harking back to Murphy, the Mitchell court said that revocation
of privileges voluntarily granted was remedial, or free of "the punitive
criminal element," and that forfeiture of goods and sanctions requiring
payment of fixed or variable sums had long been upheld as noncriminal." 9 Mitchell defined "remedial," in part, as reimbursement
to the government for the costs of investigation and for the loss
resulting from the fraud. 2 ' To support its conclusion that "in the
civil enforcement of a remedial sanction there can be no double jeopardy,''. the Court relied on Congress' intent to provide a distinctly
civil procedure for the collection of the additional assessment.122
The cases following Mitchell expanded upon this line of reasoning.
In United States ex rel Marcus v. Hess,'23 electrical contractors were
convicted of defrauding the government through collusive bidding on
Public Works Administration projects.' 24 In a qui tam action authorized by the False Claims Act, 2 ' a third party "informer" sued the
contractors civilly on behalf of the government. 2 6 The Act provided
for a $2,000-per-offense civil penalty in addition to double damages,
with half the amount recovered in a qui tam action to be paid to the
government and half to the person instituting the suit. 12 7 The lower

117. Id. at 398.
118. Id. at 399.
119. Id. at 399-400. If revocation of privileges granted is remedial, then double jeopardy
should not bar, for example, revocation of a driver's license, disbarment from the practice of law,
or revocation of a teacher's license after criminal punishment for the same offense on which the
revocation or disbarment is based.
120. Id. at 401.
121. Id. at 404.
122. Id. at 402.
123. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
124. Id. at 539-40.
125. Codified at 31 U.S.C.A. §§231-234 at the time of Hess. The qui tam, or informer,
provision is now codified at 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d) (West 1995).
126. See Hess, 317 U.S. at 539-40.
127. Id. at 540.
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court entered a judgment against the defendants for $203,000 in double
damages and $112,000 as an aggregate civil penalty for fifty-six
violations of the Act. 28
The Court found that the civil penalty was remedial because
129
Congress' purpose was restitution to the government for fraud.
Congress chose double damages plus a specific sum to assure that "the
government would be made completely whole."' 30 Moreover, citing
"common law tradition," the majority said that Congress could have
provided for treble damages, as it had in the antitrust laws.' 31
In a thoughtful and fascinating concurring opinion that portended
future debate, Justice Frankfurter would have rejected the double
jeopardy plea on different grounds.'32 He believed that the majority's distinction between punitive and remedial sanctions contained
"dialectical subtleties" that are "too subtle" when the issue is "safeguarding the humane interests" that the double jeopardy clause was
designed to protect.' 33 Noting that punitive goals may be pursued
in civil proceedings and remedial goals in criminal actions, Justice
Frankfurter deemed "speculative" a court's judgment whether
forfeiture and double damages constitute an extra penalty or an
indemnity for loss.'34 If that were the issue, he said, the respondents
should be allowed to prove that the penalty and damages were punitive
because they exceeded any reasonable calculation of loss to the
government.' 3 5 Rather, Justice Frankfurter said that double jeopardy
does not prevent Congress from allowing comprehensive penalties,
prescribed in advance, to be enforced in separate proceedings."'
Such actions were common at the time the Fifth Amendment was
written, and "[i]t would do violence to proper regard for the framers
of the Fifth Amendment to assume that they contemporaneously
enacted and continued to enact legislation that was offensive to the
guarantees of the double jeopardy clause which they had proposed for

128. Id.
129. Id. at 551.
130. Id. at 552.
131. Id. at 550.
132. Id. at 553.
133. Id. at 554.
134. Id.
135. Id. This insight of Justice Frankfurter presaged exactly what the Court did in United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 452 (1989), where, having adopted the punitive/remedial
distinction of the majority in Hess, the Court remanded the case to the lower court to determine
whether the assessment fairly compensated the government for its loss. See discussion infra
section VIA.
136. Hess, 317 U.S. at 555.
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ratification. "137 Instead, Justice Frankfurter relied on the Eighth
Amendment to protect against oppression from cumulative punishments.

138

Thirteen years later, in Rex Trailer Co. v. United States,1 39 the
Court relied on the majority's reasoning in Mitchell in deciding that
double jeopardy did not bar a civil sanction of $10,000 following a
criminal conviction and fine of $25,000.14' The case involved the
Surplus Property Act of 1944, which was designed to facilitate the
disposal of surplus war materials.14 1 These materials were in great
demand because of wartime shortages. Congress also intended the Act
to help returning veterans by giving them preference in purchasing
surplus war goods.'42 Rex Trailer Company had obtained five motor
vehicles by fraudulently using the names of five people with veterans'
preferences.' 43
In rejecting the company's double jeopardy claim, the Court
analogized this case to a case any citizen might file: "The Government
has the right to make contracts and hold and dispose of property, and,
for the protection of its property rights, it may resort to the same
remedies as a private person.""' 4 The Court concluded that liquidated damages are a "well-known" remedy 4 ' that is especially useful
"when damages are uncertain in nature or amount or are unmeasurable."' 4 6 Where reasonable, such remedies are not penalties.' 4 7
As Justice Frankfurter suggested in Hess, inquiring whether a
sanction is remedial or punitive is not an entirely satisfactory approach

137. Id. at 556. For example, the Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35 § 60, 1 Stat. 174 provided
that if goods, entered for exportation with intent to draw back the duties, were landed in the
United States, the goods and the vessels that contained them were forfeitable to the government,
and all persons involved were subject to criminal prosecution. The Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 51
§ 1-4, 2 Stat. 70-71 provided that any person with an interest in a ship used to transport slaves
would forfeit twice the value of his interest in the ship and double the value of any slave that, at
any time, may have been transported in the vessel; and any person serving on such a vessel could
be criminally convicted. The Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22 §§ 1-10, 2 Stat. 426-30 provided for
forfeiture of any vessel fitted out for the slave trade or used to transport slaves, and the Act
provided for the criminal punishment of those involved in the slave trade of up to ten years in
prison and a $10,000 fine.
138. Hess, 317 U.S. at 556.
139. 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
140. Id. at 150-51.
141. Id. at 150.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 151.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 153 (quoting Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1947)).
147. Id. at 151.
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to the question of what constitutes punishment. It invites subjective,
result-oriented interpretations of the purposes of a particular sanction.
V. WHO DETERMINES WHAT PUNISHMENTS FIT THE CRIME
To find an approach better than the remedial-punitive distinction,
courts must consider one of the early questions posed in this Article:
Was double jeopardy intended to limit the discretion of prosecutors,
of judges, of the legislature, or of all of them? Early English common
law is no guide here because (1) no such distinctions existed--everyone
represented the crown, and (2) American crimimal procedure diverged
from Britain's after the American Revolution. 148 Yet, in order to
determine whether double jeopardy includes multiple punishments, we
need to know who has the authority to establish what punishments
shall be imposed and how extensive that authority is.
Perhaps realizing the implications and complexity of potential
answers to the punishment question, in the 1980s the Court redirected
its double jeopardy analysis to the fundamental query first implicitly
recognized in Ex parte Lange: Does the Double Jeopardy Clause
diminish the Legislature's authority to determine what and how many
punishments fit the crime?' 49 If the answer is no, then, implicitly,
double jeopardy only protects against multiple prosecutions, not
multiple punishments. The case law supports that answer.
Until 1989, the case law held clearly and almost without exception
that double jeopardy did not restrict the power of the Legislature to
determine what punishments to impose and even to impose cumulative
punishments if it so chose. The job of the courts was to determine
what the Legislature intended.
In criminal cases, this meant that double jeopardy did not bar a
more severe sentence upon reconviction after a successful appeal of the
first conviction by the defendant, as long as the defendant received
credit for time served under the first conviction 5 0 It meant, in
Albernaz v. United States,' where the defendants were convicted of
conspiracy to distribute marijuana and conspiracy to import marijuana,
that double jeopardy did not bar consecutive sentences because "the
question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not
different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch

148. See generally SIGLER, supra note 3, at 4-21, 36.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 39-51.
150. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 719-21 (1969), overruled on other grounds
by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).

151.

450 U.S. 333 (1981).
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intended to be imposed .2 . [and] Congress intended . .. to impose
15
multiple punishments."
Even where Justices were divided on the outcome, they agreed
that legislative intent was the fulcrum around which the double
jeopardy decision ought to turn. In Whalen v. United States,"3 the
defendant was given consecutive sentences on charges of rape and
felony murder based on the same offense."5 4 The majority opinion,
written by Justice Stewart, held that because Congress had not
intended to impose multiple punishments for those offenses, double
jeopardy barred consecutive sentences.' 5 Justice White, concurring,
said that the case could have been decided strictly by statutory
construction, not constitutional interpretation.5 6 Justice Blackmun,
also concurring, said that "[t]he only function the Double Jeopardy
Clause serves in cases challenging multiple punishments is to prevent
the prosecutor from bringing more charges, and the sentencing court
from imposing greater punishments, than the Legislative Branch
It serves, in my considered view, nothing more. '
intended.
Justice Blackmun went on to say that dicta in other cases indicating
otherwise had led to "confusion among state courts that have attempted
to decipher our pronouncements concerning the Double Jeopardy
Clause's role in the area of multiple punishments," and such dicta
should be squarely repudiated. 5 Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, also
noted the confusion in the field, and said that "our opinions, including
ones authored by me, are replete with mea culpa's occasioned by shifts
in assumptions and emphasis." ' 9 Justice Rehnquist concluded that
double jeopardy was not implicated in Whalen and that the Court
should have deferred to the lower court's analysis of whether consecuWhalen is particularly notable
tive sentences were intended. 60
because all of the opinions agreed that legislative intent was the
determining factor.

152. Id. at 344.
153. 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
154. Id. at 685.
155. Id. at 689-90.
156. Id. at 695-96.
157. Id. at 697.
158. Id. at 698. This is an interesting comment from the author of the Halper opinion,
which just nine years later was to create. such turmoil in the area of double jeopardy analysis. See

discussion infra section VI.A.
159. Whalen, 445 U.S. at 699.
160. See id. at 705, 714.
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In Missouri v. Hunter,16 1 the Court similarly deferred to legislative intent. There, the Missouri Supreme Court had considered the
Whalen and Albernaz opinions and ruled that cumulative sentences for
armed criminal action and robbery convictions constituted multiple
punishments for the same offense and, hence, violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause.' 62 Previously, the Missouri Supreme Court had
issued a direct challenge to the United States Supreme Court:
Until such time as the Supreme Court of the United States declares
clearly and unequivocally that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not apply
to the legislative branch of government, we cannot do other than
what we perceive to be our duty to refuse to enforce multiple
punishments of the same offense arising out of a single transaction.161
In response to the Missouri court's challenge, the Supreme Court
said, unequivocally, that "[w]here, as here, a legislature specifically
authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of
whether those two statutes proscribe the 'same' conduct under
'' 64
Blockburger, a court's task of statutory construction is at an end.
The Court held that "the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than
prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than
6
the legislature intended.'
The Court has also deferred to legislative intent in the realm of
parallel civil and criminal proceedings. In 1972, the Court considered
One Lot of Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 166 the case of a
jewelry dealer who brought emeralds and a ring into the country
without declaring them. 1 67 After the defendant was tried and acquitted of smuggling, the Government sued to forfeit the jewels.' 68 The
Court found that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the forfeiture
because "it involves neither two criminal trials nor two criminal
punishments.' 169 Noting that the civil and criminal sanctions were
in different parts of the statute, the Court found that "Congress could
161. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
162. See id. at 364. The Court determined that the convictions were for the same offense
under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
163. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 365 (quoting State v. Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44, 51 (Mo. 1981),
cert. granted and judgment vacated, 459 U.S. 1192 (1983)).
164. Id. at 368-69.
165. Id. at 366.
166. 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
167. Id. at 232.
168. Id. at 233.
169. Id. at 235.
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and did order both civil and criminal sanctions, clearly distinguishing
them. There is no reason for frustrating that design.' 170 The Court
analyzed the purposes of the sanction and determined that they were
remedial, providing both a reasonable form of liquidated damages for
violation of the law and reimbursement for investigation and enforcement expenses.171
In United States v. Ward,17 the Court similarly deferred to
legislative intent in determining whether a civil statute was punitive.
Oil had escaped from a facility leased and operated by L.O. Ward,
doing business as L.O. Ward Oil & Gas Operations.'
Ward
notified the Environmental Protection Agency, as required under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). 74 The FWPCA
prohibited such discharges into navigable waters, imposed a duty to
inform the government of any discharge, and imposed criminal liability
for failure to inform. But use immunity was provided so that
notification of a spill could not be used against the notifying person in
a criminal case. 7 5 The law provided for a civil penalty for each
discharge violation, and the money was to be paid to a revolving fund
used to finance cleanups of oil spills. 76 Ward claimed that the
reporting requirements of the FWPCA violated his Fifth Amendment
177
privilege against self-incrimination.
Although Ward was not a double jeopardy case, the Court relied
on double jeopardy cases to determine whether the penalty under the
FWPCA was civil or criminal.' 78 The Court concluded that Congress had intended to impose a civil penalty without regard to the
"procedural protections and restrictions available in criminal prosecutions,"' 79 and that the statutory scheme was not so punitive in
purpose or effect as to negate Congress' intention.'
A few years after Ward, the Court considered United States v.
One Assortment of 89 Firearms,'' the case of Patrick Mulcahey, a gun

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 236-37.
Id. at 237.
448 U.S. 242 (1980).
Id. at 246.
Id. at 244, 246.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 245-46.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 248-49.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 249-51.
465 U.S. 354 (1984).
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239

dealer who was prosecuted for dealing in firearms without 18a3
license.1 2 After claiming entrapment, Mulcahey was acquitted.
The Government then sued in rem to forfeit the seized firearms, and
the court of appeals held that the forfeiture was barred by double
jeopardy. 4 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals,
noting that the civil forfeiture provision covered broader conduct than
the criminal statute. 185
Furthermore, relying on Mitchell and
Ward,186 the Court said that the forfeiture sanction was not intended
as punishment because Congress' purpose was to discourage unregulated commerce in firearms and keep "potentially dangerous weapons out
of the hands of unlicensed dealers."' 8 7 The Court stated that
"'[o]nly the clearest proof' that the purpose and effect of the forfeiture
are punitive will suffice to override Congress' manifest preference for
a civil sanction. '
In Ward, One Lot of Emerald Cut Stones, and One Assortment of
89 Firearms, the Court looked at the statutes and legislative intent to
determine whether the sanction was punitive and whether Congress
intended to impose cumulative punishments. In all three cases, the
Court showed great deference to legislatures and the purposes behind
their laws.
VI.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY ANALYSIS
A.

Halper

In 1989, Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in United
States v. Halper,8 9 the opinion that fundamentally changed double
jeopardy law in the civil-criminal context. Halperwas the first case to
diminish the deference previously given to legislative intent.19 ° Irwin
Halper managed a medical laboratory and submitted sixty-five false
claims for Medicare reimbursement. Those sixty-five false claims
resulted in a total loss to the Government of $585. The Government
indicted and convicted Halper of filing the false claims, and he was

182. Id. at 355-56.
183. Id. at 356.
184. Id. at 356-57.
185. Id. at 363 (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) subjects to forfeiture any firearm "used or
intended to be used in, any violation" of the statute).
186. See id.
187. Id. at 364.
188. Id. at 365 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242. 249 (1980)).

189. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
190. See id. at 447.
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sentenced to two years in prison and fined $5,000.111 In a classic
case of government-run-amok, the Government then sued Halper
civilly under the False Claims Act, seeking $2,000 per false claim,
double damages, and costs of the civil action. 9 2 The amount of the
per claim
penalty, $130,000, was 220 times the Government's actual
19 3
loss.

The Court framed the question before it as whether the statutory
penalty constituted a second punishment for purposes of double
jeopardy analysis.'94 Framing the question in this way, however,
ignored the teachings of Albernaz, Hunter, and Justice Blackmun's own
pronouncement in Whalen, that double jeopardy does not restrict the
Legislature's ability to impose two punishments for the same offense. 195

The Court stated that it was rejecting its previous statutory
construction approach because that approach is "not well suited to the
context of the 'humane interests' safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause's proscription of multiple punishments."' 96 The Court held
that "under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has
been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an
additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not
fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution."' 197 Discussing Mitchell, Hess, and Rex Trailer at length, the
Halpercourt concluded that the "relevant teaching of these cases is that
the Government is entitled to rough remedial justice, that is, it may
demand compensation according to somewhat imprecise formulas, such
as reasonable liquidated damages or a fixed sum plus double damages,
without being deemed to have imposed a second punishment for the
purpose of double jeopardy analysis."' 98
The Court acknowledged that the Legislature may authorize
cumulative punishment in a single proceeding under two statutes for
the same course of conduct. 9 9 Near the end of the opinion, the

191. Id. at 437.
192. Id. at 438.
193. Id. at 439.
194. Id. at 441.
195. See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
196. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 (quoting Ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 554 (1943)).
While Justice Blackmun cites Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Hess, he does not adopt
that reasoning. Id.
197. Id. at 448-49.
198. Id. at 446.
199. Id. at 451 n.10. This contravenes Justice Frankfurter's conclusion in Unites States ex
rel. Marcus v. Hess that the Legislature can authorize cumulative punishments in separate
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Court reiterated its only proscription-that "the Government may not
criminally prosecute a defendant, impose a criminal penalty upon him,
and then bring a separate civil action based on the same conduct and
receive a judgment that is not rationally related to the goal of making
the Government whole."20 0 The Court remanded the case to the
district court so the Government could present an accounting of its
actual costs. 0 1
Although the Court was justifiably outraged at the nature of the
remedy the Government was seeking and the fact that the Government
was seeking a second sanction because it was dissatisfied with the
first,20 2 the Court's analysis in Halper has disturbing ramifications.
The Court has now stated that double jeopardy is not implicated if the
Legislature intended to impose cumulative punishments for the same
offense in the criminal arena, where the sanctions are clearly penal and
liberty interests are at stake.20 3 But a civil sanction that follows a
criminal conviction (where both are intended by the Legislature) is
barred to the extent the civil sanction is not remedial.204 The Court
never explained why it will defer to legislative intent in criminal cases
like Hunter and Whalen where a person's liberty is at stake, but not
where money or property is at issue. Rather, the Court said that
double jeopardy protection is "intrinsically personal" and that a double
jeopardy violation "can be identified only by assessing the character of
the actual sanction imposed on the individual by the machinery of the
proceedings. See supra text accompanying notes 123-138. The Court relied on a quotation from
Missouriv. Hunter: "Where... a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under
two statutes ... the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may impose cumulative
punishment under such statutes in a single trial." 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983). But the Halper
court broadened considerably the import of the quotation by taking a phrase from a criminal case
that necessarily involved only one proceeding and applying it in the civil-criminal context. See
id. at 368. Since Hunter was a criminal case, two proceedings would have meant two prosecutions,
and multiple prosecutions are barred by double jeopardy. Some courts have used the "single
proceeding" line from Halper, combined with Halper's footnote 10, to find no double jeopardy
where a civil proceeding and criminal case were conducted contemporaneously, were based on the
same information from the same investigator, and were heard by the same judge. These courts
found that the proceedings, although in different courts, were, in effect, a single coordinated
prosecution. See United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 5. Ct. 922 (1994). But see United
States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 1994), amended on denial of
reh'g, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), and cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No.
95-345, 95-346).
200. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451.
201. Id. at 452.
202. See id. at 451 n.10.
203. See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1981); Whalen v. United States,
445 U.S. 684, 689-690 (1980); State v. Calle, 125 Wash. 2d 769, 776, 888 P.2d 155, 158 (1995).
204. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49.
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state." 205 This interpretation of double. jeopardy, which permits a
person to be punished twice criminally, but not be subject to separate
civil and criminal punishments, unmistakably elevates property
interests above liberty interests and interferes with the Legislature's
prerogative to determine punishment.
The Halper court did not see its opinion as far reaching, and it
took pains to limit its decision as "a rule for the rare case .. .where

a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge offender
to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has
caused."2 °6 This language, however, practically defines an excessive
fines inquiry based on proportionality. Although the Court cited
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Hess, the Court failed to
use his common-sense approach to double jeopardy. Had the Court
used that approach, it would have viewed Halper as an Eighth
Amendment excessive fines case, an easier and more direct way to curb
the Government's overreaching. 7
B. Halper's Aftermath
An obvious question, following Halper, is how a case, seemingly
so narrowly confined, could engender such chaos in the field of double
jeopardy. The answer requires an understanding of the legislative
changes that began in the 1970s affecting parallel criminal actions and
civil forfeitures, and an analysis of the cases following Halper.
1. Legislation That Created New Tools to Fight Crimes
Forfeitures, long a part of American law, had their genesis in
English law. In England, the value of an object that directly or
indirectly caused the death of another was forfeited to the crown.2"'
Similarly, convicted felons were required to forfeit their personal

205. Id. at 447.
206. Id. at 449.
207. Compare Dep't of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1955 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision is entirely unnecessary to preserve individual liberty,
because the Excessive Fines Clause is available to protect criminals from governmental
overreaching."). In fact, at the same time it was considering Halper,the Court was considering
an excessive fines case for the first time. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989). In that case, the Court held that punitive damages in
litigation between private parties does not violate the Excessive Fines Clause because the Eighth
Amendment was intended to prevent excessive fines imposed by the government, not by private
parties. Id. at 259-60; see also Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (applying the
Excessive Fines Clause to an in rem forfeiture by the Government).
208. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974). This kind
of forfeiture was called a deodand. Id.
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property to the crown, and their lands escheated to their lords.2 °9
Traitors also forfeited all of their property to the crown.2 10 In
addition, statutes provided for forfeiture, mostly in rem, of objects used
to violate customs and revenue laws.21 '
Although American forfeitures were based on this English
tradition, only statutory forfeitures survived in America:212
"[A]lmost immediately after adoption of the Constitution, ships and
cargoes involved in customs offenses were made subject to forfeiture
under federal law," and forfeitures were also authorized for ships
involved in piracy and slave trading.213 Forfeitures were also authorized and used under the revenue and liquor control laws.21 4 Beginning in the 1970s, government became increasingly concerned about
organized crime and crimes motivated by greed, including drug
trafficking. As a result, a plethora of laws was passed authorizing new
ways to combat these crimes, including forfeiture of proceeds of the
crimes and of property used to facilitate the crimes.
Passage of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act21 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise
section of the Controlled Substances Act216 began this trend. Both
of these laws included new criminal forfeiture provisions. Other new
laws provided for civil forfeitures, including the Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act2 17 and the Psychotropic Substances Act
of 1978.21
In the 1980s, Congress continued this trend, amending the drug
laws to authorize forfeiture of real property used to facilitate drug
crimes," 9 and enacting comprehensive money laundering laws that
were also intended to curb drug trafficking.220 These laws all greatly
expanded the government's ability to compel forfeiture of proceeds of
crimes and property used to facilitate crimes.

209. Id. at 682.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 682-83; see also supra note 137.
213. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682-83; see supra note 137.
214. See supra notes 91-112 and accompanying text.
215. 18 U.S.C.A. §§1961-1968 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995).
216. 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995).
217. The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, which pertains to search and
forfeiture of monetary instruments, was enacted in 1970. Tit. II, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat.
1114 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. § 5317 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995)).
218. Pub. L. 95-633, 92 Stat. 3768 (codified as amended, in part, at 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(aX6)
(West 1981)).
219. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(7) (West 1981).
220. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (West Supp. 1995).
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This trend occurred in the states as well. In Washington, the
legislature enacted, and then amended, a drug forfeiture law modeled
after, but not identical to, the federal law.221 The law was amended
several times during the 1980s, and it eventually included forfeiture of
real property that was either purchased with proceeds of drug crimes
or used to facilitate drug crimes. 22 2 The legislature also passed the
Criminal Profiteering Act, Washington State's version of RICO, which
provides for civil forfeitures.223 Washington law now also provides
for forfeiture of proceeds of money laundering,224 instrumentalities
used to commit felonies or property acquired with the proceeds of
many felonies,225 property used to facilitate the crimes of gam227 and firearms posbling 226 and sexual exploitation of a minor,
2 28
sessed or used in violation of various laws.
In passing these laws, the state and federal legislatures were
attempting to remove the enormous profit incentive that attracts drug
dealers and other criminals to their trade. Before these laws were
implemented, major drug dealers who got caught would serve their
time, get out of prison, and retire on their ill-gotten gains or use them
to finance their return to the drug distribution network. "Doing their
time" was a cost of doing business. Few significant drug traffickers are
addicts. They are motivated not by their own habits, but by greed.
The forfeiture laws were designed to target those at the top of the drug
distribution ladder-those who live off the profits illegally derived
from the addictions and misfortunes of others. Where is the justice in
a society that sentences a nineteen-year-old street-corner crack dealer
to prison for twenty-one to twenty-seven months for a first
offense,229 but will not forfeit the property of the wealthy supplier
who makes it possible for the street-corner dealer to deal and to be
addicted? Forfeiture laws were, and remain, a valuable tool for
fighting organized crime, major drug activity, and other crimes
motivated by greed.
Any tool, however, can be abused. Halper was not a forfeiture
case, but a case brought under the False Claims Act, 230 an act which
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505 (1994).
See id. § (a)(8).
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.82.100 (1994).
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.83,030 (1994).
WASH. REV. CODE § 10.105.010 (1994).
WASH. REv. CODE § 9.46.231 (1994).
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.120 (1994).
WASH. REv. CODE § 9.41.098 (1994).
See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.50.401, 9.94A,320, 9,94A.310 (1994).
31 U.S.C.A. §§3729-3731 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995).
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has been used well and appropriately for years. Many of the recent
double jeopardy decisions, like Halper, have been classic examples of
bad facts making bad law. The bad facts involved, as in Halper,
government overreaching.
2.

Austin

States231

was the first major Supreme Court
Austin v. United
case following Halper that affected double jeopardy law, and it was not
a double jeopardy case at all, but an excessive fines case. Like Halper,
its facts were egregious. Richard Lyle Austin met an undercover agent
at his auto body shop, agreed to sell him two ounces of cocaine, and
went to his mobile home to retrieve the cocaine.2 32 The next day,
state authorities executed a search warrant at the home and body shop,
discovering a small amount of marijuana and cocaine, a .22 caliber
revolver, drug paraphernalia, and approximately $4,700.233 Austin
pled guilty in South Dakota to one count of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine and was sentenced to seven years in prison. The
federal government also sued for forfeiture of Austin's home and body
shop.234 Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, double jeopardy was
not applicable.23 Thus, Austin claimed that the forfeiture was an
excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. 36
Justice Blackmun wrote the Court's opinion. Predictably, he
relied on Halper for much of his analysis as to what constitutes
punishment.23 7 First, he undertook a historical analysis to determine
whether forfeiture was understood, in part, as punishment at the time
the Eighth Amendment was ratified, concluding that it was.238 Based
on its historical analysis, the Court held that forfeitures under the drug
239
to be
rather
than remediforfeiture
were intended
al. 24 0 Thestatute
Government
had argued
thatpunitive
forfeiting
property
used to

231. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
232. Id. at 2803.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, double jeopardy does not apply if separate
sovereigns prosecute or punish. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1978); Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 136-38 (1959).
236. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2308.
237. See id. at 2805-06.
238. Id. at 2806. For this analysis he relied primarily on Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), a case involving due process, not double jeopardy or excessive
fines.
239. 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(4), (7) (West 1981 & Supp. 1995).
240. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
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facilitate a crime removed instrumentalities of the drug trade, and was
therefore remedial. 241 The Court rejected the Government's argument based on a quotation from One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania:242 "There is nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an
automobile. ' 243 The Court used this quotation out of context,
however. 244 Astonishingly, the Court's use of this quotation implies
that forfeiture of property that facilitates a crime, or is an instrumentality of a crime, cannot be remedial unless the property is contraband.
The Court also rejected the Government's argument by relying on
dicta in Halper that stated, "A civil sanction that cannot fairly be said
solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as
also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment. '"245 The dicta in Halper can only have been meant to support
Halper's conclusion that punishment was involved and, thus, the
multiple punishments prong of double jeopardy analysis applied in that
case. If the Halper court had meant that all civil punishment is barred
by double jeopardy, it would not have remanded the case to the trial
court to determine what part of the penalty was remedial.
Based on this dicta, the Austin court held that facilitation
forfeitures under the federal drug forfeiture statute are punitive.246
This reliance upon dicta from Halper is misplaced because that dicta
implicitly contradicts the holding in Halper, which says that double
jeopardy bars a civil sanction following a criminal conviction only to
the extent the civil sanction is not remedial. 247 As in Halper, the
Austin court did not find the forfeiture or the statute unconstitutional.
But, having determined that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to civil
drug forfeitures, the Court remanded the case so that the lower courts
could develop a test for determining when a forfeiture is excessive.248

241. Id. at 2811.
242. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
243. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811 (citing One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S.
693, 699 (1965)).
244. In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, the Court held that the exclusionary rule applied in a
civil forfeiture proceeding where evidence had been seized from a car without a warrant. 380 U.S.
at 696, 702. The Government could not forfeit the car since the only evidence supporting
forfeiture was illegally seized. See id. at 698. The Court said that if the car had been contraband,
the Government would not necessarily have to return it, but since there is nothing illegal about
owning the car, without further evidence of its forfeitabiity, the Government must return it. Id.
at 699. The issue in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan is far removed from the issue of whether
facilitation forfeitures may be remedial. See id. at 698-70.
245. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)).
246. Id.
247. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49.
248. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.

1996]

Civil Forfeitures and Criminal Punishment

This discussion in Austin of the Halper dicta only created more
confusion about double jeopardy and has led to troublesome and
sometimes tortured analyses. Many lower courts have applied Austin's
"solely remedial" language in the double jeopardy context.24 9 Others
continue to apply Halper to determine what part of a sanction is
remedial and what part punitive.3 5 The Ninth Circuit has accepted
the facile argument that because Austin holds that drug-related civil
forfeitures are punishment for purposes of excessive fines analysis,
regardless of the value of the property or the government's damages,
all in rem drug forfeitures are also punishment for purposes of double
jeopardy analysis.2"'
This analysis is flawed, however. If all in rem drug forfeitures are
punishment for double jeopardy purposes, then all drug forfeitures
following criminal convictions would be barred, regardless of legislative
intent, remedial character, or the "intrinsically personal" nature of
double jeopardy protection. This argument assumes that the double
jeopardy and excessive fines provisions protect the same interests, when
clearly they do not.
For example, in the context of parallel civil and criminal actions,
double jeopardy analysis (at least under current law) asks whether a
person has been punished twice for the same offense. Under Halper,
to determine if a second sanction is punishment, the court must
consider whether any portion of the civil sanction was remedial. 2
Under the Excessive Fines Clause, the threshold question, according
to Austin, is whether punishment has been imposed at all, regardless
of the number of sanctions.2" 3 Then the court must weigh the
proportionality of the punishment to the offense.2 54 These two
analyses are fundamentally different. Therefore, application of an
excessive fines analysis in the double jeopardy context is inappropriate,
and Austin should not apply to determine the existence of double
jeopardy in parallel civil and criminal proceedings.

249. See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64
U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-345, 95-346); Unites States v. $405,089.23 U.S.
Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir. 1994), amended on denial of reh'g, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir.
1995), and cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1996) (No. 95-345, 95-346).
250. See, e.g., United States v. Ogbuehi, 897 F. Supp. 887, 891-92 (E.D. Pa. 1995); SEC
v. O'Hegan, 901 F. Supp. 1461, 1469-70 (D. Minn. 1995).
251. See, e.g., $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1221.
252. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
253. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
254. Id.
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3. Kurth Ranch
In 1994, double jeopardy arose in yet another context in the case
of Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch. 5 Montana's
Dangerous Drug Tax Act,25 6 which took effect in 1987, imposed a
tax on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs.257 This tax
was to be collected only after state or federal fines or forfeitures were
satisfied, and the tax was computed at ten percent of the market value
of the drugs or a specified amount per drug. s8 The obligation to
pay the tax arose at the time of arrest, and tax forms were to be filed
at the time the taxpayer was arrested. 59 The Kurth family, who
engaged in grain and livestock farming, had expanded their operation
to include marijuana cultivation. Montana authorities seized an
enormous quantity of marijuana (including 2,155 plants and more than
of hash
eight pounds of dry marijuana) and a substantial quantity
261
oil. 260 All of the defendants pled guilty to various crimes.
Montana's Department of Revenue then tried to collect almost
$900,000 in taxes and penalties under the new law. 262 The Kurths
filed for bankruptcy and then challenged the constitutionality of the
Montana tax.263 The bankruptcy court held that the tax subjected
the Kurths to double jeopardy. 264 In the bankruptcy court proceeding, Montana had "failed to introduce one scintilla of evidence as to
[the] cost of the ... government programs265or costs of law enforcement
incurred to combat illegal drug activity.
The question addressed by the Court in Kurth Ranch was
"whether a tax on the possession of illegal drugs assessed after the
State has imposed a criminal penalty for the same conduct may violate
the constitutional prohibition against successive punishments for the
same offense. ' 266 While the Court declined to apply a Halper

255. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
256. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-25-101 to -123 (1995) (repealed 1987).
257. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1941.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1941-42.
260. Id. at 1942 & n.7.
261. See id. at 1942.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1942-43.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1943 (quoting Kurth Ranch v. Dep't of Revenue of Montana (In re Kurth
Ranch), 145 B.R. 61, 74 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990), affd, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
266. Id. at 1941.
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analysis to determine whether the tax was punitive or remedial,267 the
Court did cite Halper for the proposition that double jeopardy
protection is intrinsically personal.2 6
The Court also cited the
holding from Halper, 69 not the dicta that caused such confusion after
Austin. In fact, Kurth Ranch contravened Halper's controversial dicta
by stating that "while a high tax rate and deterrent purpose lend
support to the characterization of the drug tax as punishment, these
features, in and of themselves, do not necessarily render the tax
punitive."7
This language is inconsistent with the dicta from
Halper that all forfeitures, penalties, or taxes are punitive unless they
are solely remedial.27 1
Kurth Ranch was a five-to-four opinion with three separate
dissents. These dissents indicate that some members of the Court are
beginning to re-examine double jeopardy analysis in light of its
historical roots and the turmoil occurring in the law. In his dissenting
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist said that Kurth Ranch clearly was not
the "rare case" contemplated by Halper and implied that Halper may
have been wrongly decided.2 72 In her dissent, Justice O'Connor
noted that the consequences of the majority's ruling were "astounding"
and said that the decision was "entirely unnecessary to preserve
individual liberty, because the Excessive Fines Clause is available to
'
protect criminals from governmental overreaching."273
Applying
Halper,Justice O'Connor said that the defendant must first show that
the amount of the sanction was not rationally related to the Government's non-punitive objectives, and then the burden shifts to the
Government to justify the sanction in the particular case.274 That
was not done here.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia returned to the origins of double
jeopardy law in this country, stating that double jeopardy applies to

267. The Court said that the Halper test is inappropriate because taxes serve a different
purpose than civil penalties: "they are usually motivated by revenue-raising rather than punitive
purposes," id. at 1946, and "determining whether the exaction was remedial or punitive 'simply
does not work in the case of a tax statute."' Id. at 1948 (citations omitted). In effect, the tax here
of $100 per ounce of marijuana is very like the civil penalty of $2,000 per false claim in Halper.
268. Id. at 1946.
269. Id. at 1945.
270. Id. at 1947.
271. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.
272. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1949. Chief Justice Rehnquist said that because the Court
did not undertake a Halper analysis to determine whether the sanction was remedial or punitive,
it was unnecessary to determine whether Halper was correctly decided. Id.
273. Id. at 1955.
274. Id. at 1954.
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To
multiple prosecutions only, not to multiple punishments. 275
support this proposition, he cited Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion in United States ex rel Marcus v. Hess,276 as well as other
cases."2 7 Justice Scalia noted "that, until Halper, the Court [had]
27
never invalidated a legislatively authorized successive punishment.." 1
The combined effect of the Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch
opinions has been an utterly divided lower court system. Courts have
found creative new ways of interpreting double jeopardy, based on the
Supreme Court's opinions, in order to reach particular results. The
problem, of course, is that egregious facts occur on both sides and,
because the Supreme Court's decisions have been so convoluted and
inconsistent, courts have ample precedent to support whatever results
they want.
The primary disagreement in Halper's aftermath revolves around
the question of punishment. The Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits
have held that forfeiture of proceeds of crimes is never punishment
because it involves only forfeiture of property that the claimant did not
lawfully own or earn and because the claimant has no reasonable
expectation that the law will permit his continued possession of such
proceeds.279 These circuits suggest that such forfeitures are always
proportional to the crime, and thus always remedial, because forfeiture
of proceeds compensates government and society for the costs of
detection, investigation, and prosecution of crimes, as well as the costs
of "combating the allure of illegal drugs" and caring for its vicIn contrast, the Ninth Circuit has held that any civil
tims. 2 8
forfeiture is punishment."'
Most jurisdictions have found that a person whose property is
forfeited by default has not been punished if he did not claim the
property.2 8 2 Some courts have held that parallel civil and criminal

275. Id. at 1955.

276. 317 U.S. 537, 555-56 (1943).
277. For example, see William v. Bradley (In re Bradley), 318 U.S. 50, 53 (1943) (Stone,
C.J., dissenting).
278. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1956.
279. See United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Alexander, 32 F.3d 1231, 1236 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 300 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 573 (1994); see also SEC v, Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 696 (D.C. Cir.

1994).
280. See Tilley, 18 F.3d at 299.
281. See $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d. at 1221.
282. The theories for this vary. Some courts say that a person must become a party to an
action for jeopardy to attach: "You can't have double jeopardy without a former jeopardy."
United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994); accord
United States v. Arreola-Ramos, 60 F.3d 188, 192 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[It is axiomatic that there
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proceedings are a "single coordinated prosecution" and therefore, under
Halper, a single proceeding where cumulative punishments are
allowed." 3 Others have said that parallel civil and criminal proceedings can never be a single proceeding for purposes of double jeopardy
analysis. 2"
Following Halper, the question of what constitutes
punishment for double jeopardy purposes remains one of two main
issues in the area of parallel civil forfeiture and criminal proceedings.

2

85

VII.

CONCLUSION

The historical roots of double jeopardy are not nearly so clear as
some cases and commentators suggest. We do not, in fact, know
whether the Framers of the Constitution intended to include double
punishment in double jeopardy. Because, as Justice Frankfurter said
in Hess, it was then common to allow comprehensive penalties
prescribed in advance to be enforced in separate proceedings, it is likely
that double jeopardy was not meant to apply to double punishment.
Certainly early Supreme Court decisions disagreed on the purpose of
the Double Jeopardy Clause.28 6 Perhaps because of uncertainty
about the original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the
Supreme Court has been inconsistent, confusing, and result-oriented
in its double jeopardy opinions.
The time has come for the Court to resolve the conflicts among
the circuits and formulate a double jeopardy policy that protects
against multiple prosecutions and excessive punishments, and still
permits legislatures to establish policies that further their law enforcement goals. The legal framework exists.
Double jeopardy's history, derived from the ancient pleas in bar
of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit, shows that double jeopardy was
meant to be a check on prosecutors and multiple prosecutions, not on
legislative authority. The Double Jeopardy Clause should, therefore,

can be no punishment if the property forfeited did not belong to the person claiming jeopardy.");
United States v. Amiel, 995 F.2d 367, 371-72 (2d Cir. 1993). Others have found that a person
who fails to claim the property has abandoned it and, therefore, has not been punished by its
forfeiture. See United States v. Cretacci, 62 F.3d 307, 310 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert.filed,
(U.S. Feb. 13, 1996) (No. 95-7955).
283. See 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d at 1499; Millan, 2 F.3d at 19-20.
284. See $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1217.
285. The other main issue is what constitutes the same offense. See supra section III.
286. Compare Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873) with Ball v. United States, 163
U.S. 662 (1896). See discussion supra section II.C.1.
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be interpreted to apply to multiple prosecutions, not multiple punishments.
There is nothing inherently unconstitutional about civil penalties
or forfeitures. Legislative goals to remove the profit from drug
trafficking, money laundering, and other crimes motivated by greed
further society's goals and are just. They are meant to deprive major
drug dealers and other criminals of their ill-gotten gains-their
incentive to deal drugs.
Clearly legislatures can impose multiple criminal punishments for
the same offense.28 7 It would be manifestly unjust to permit multiple
criminal punishments for the same offense, but to prohibit a criminal
and a civil sanction for the same offense. If a legislature decides that
a civil financial sanction in addition to a criminal penalty will be more
effective in deterring criminals from the drug trade than excessive
sentences or multiple criminal penalties, no law or constitutional
provision prohibits it from doing so.
The Supreme Court is legitimately concerned about government
overreaching. But it need not engage in tortured analysis that opens
the door for lower courts to infer that double jeopardy bars all civil
sanctions following criminal prosecutions or criminal prosecutions
following civil sanctions. The Excessive Fines Clause prohibits
excessive fines imposed by the government. Period. Whether there
has been one proceeding or more. The Excessive Fines Clause requires
that a punitive civil sanction be proportional to the crime, whether or
not there has been a criminal sanction.
The Court should explicitly limit double jeopardy analysis in the
context of civil and criminal proceedings as follows: The Court should
defer to Congress to determine what punishments fit the crime.
Moreover, the same elements test of Dixon and Blockburger should
apply so that if either offense contains an element not contained in the
other, they are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes.
This would mean that most civil allegations and criminal charges
would not be the same offense.
The Court should develop proportionality guidelines under the
Excessive Fines Clause that would curb any inclination for government
overreaching in the context of civil sanctions. If the Court adopts this
approach, criminal defendant property owners will be protected from
both multiple prosecutions and excessive financial punishments, and
legislative prerogatives will be protected.

287. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S.
684, 688 (1980); State v. Calle, 125 Wash. 2d 769, 776, 888 P.2d 155, 158 (1995); see supra
section V.

